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405 
THE POTENTIAL COSTS OF CAPITALISM: 
WHY CHINA’S MARKET ECONOMY IS AT THE 
ROOT OF ITS ANTI-SECESSION LAW 
For the past 50 years, the People’s Republic of China (P.R.C. or China) 
has claimed that there is only one China, and that Taiwan is a part of 
China.1 Taiwan has, however, maintained that it is separate and distinct 
from mainland China.2 When this dispute began, China was relatively 
passive in asserting its sovereignty.3 While China firmly asserted that 
Taiwan was part of China, reunification was considered a long term goal 
at best.4 More recently, however, China has become increasingly 
aggressive in its reunification efforts, attempting to begin reunification 
immediately. 
On March 13, 2005, China passed a law forbidding “secession from 
China by secessionists in the name of ‘Taiwan independence.’”5 This law 
authorizes China to use “non-peaceful means and other necessary 
measures to protect China’s sovereignty and territorial integrity,”6 
marking the first time that China passed a law asserting this right. This 
Note discusses how China’s increasing market capitalism has strengthened 
its stance on reunification, culminating in the passing of the 2005 Anti-
Secession Law by: (1) viewing the historical relationship between China 
and Taiwan; (2) analyzing the trends of increasing market capitalism and 
increasing aggression in China; and (3) discussing China’s plan for 
reunification. 
 
 
 1. See infra note 125 and accompanying text. 
 2. Taiwan, CIA World Factbook, https://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/tw.html. 
 3. See infra notes 50–59 and accompanying text. 
 4. See infra text accompanying notes 50–56. 
 5. Anti-Secession Law (Promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Mar. 13, 
2005, effective Mar. 13, 2005), art. 1, available at http://www.china.org.cn/ (search “anti-seccession 
law article 1”; then follow “Third Secession 10th National People’s Congress and Chinese People’s 
Political Consultative Conference” link), translated in China.org, Third Session 10th National 
People’s Congress and Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference. 
 6. Id. art. 8.  
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I. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 
The modern battle7 over Taiwan’s sovereignty was largely a product of 
the First Sino-Japanese War, several proclamations made during World 
War II, and the international treaties made thereafter.8 The First Sino-
Japanese War,9 which only lasted from August 1894 to April 1895, 
resulted in a decisive loss for China.10 On April 17, 1895, China was 
compelled to sign the Treaty of Shimonoseki,11 which provided, inter alia, 
that China would cede Taiwan to Japan in perpetuity.12 
Following the promulgation of the treaty, Japan ruled Taiwan as a 
sovereign13 and without dispute from the international community.14 
Despite this fact, the United States, Britain, and China sought to invalidate 
the treaty during World War II. These countries, calling themselves “The 
Three Great Allies,” issued the Cairo Communiqué in 1943.15 The 
 
 
 7. The sovereignty of Taiwan (originally named “Formosa” by the Portuguese) has been 
disputed for hundreds of years. See Jonathan I. Charney & J. R. V. Prescott, Resolving Cross-Strait 
Relations Between China and Taiwan, 94 AM. J. INT’L L. 453, 454 (2000). China had ruled the 
territory in an administrative capacity as early as the late 1200s, but lost control on numerous 
occasions. Administration of Taiwan in Recent Centuries: The Ming Period, http://www.tpg.gov.tw/e-
english/history/history-e-2_1.htm (last visited Feb. 13, 2007). Since the early 1600s, many nations, 
including China, Japan, Spain, and the Netherlands, have fought to control Taiwan. Id. In 1895, China 
lost Taiwan to Japan, leading almost directly to the modern battle over Taiwan’s sovereignty. Charney 
& Prescott, supra at 456–57; see also infra notes 7–33 and accompanying text.  
 8. See infra notes 7–56 and accompanying text.  
 9. A dispute over the military presence of Japanese forces in Korea caused the First Sino-
Japanese War. See The Columbia Encyclopedia 2616 (Paul Legassé ed., 6th ed. 2000).  
 10. Japan won relatively easily with modern army and superior naval skills. Id.; Reference.com, 
First Sino-Japanese War, http://www.reference.com/browse/wiki/First_Sino-Japanese_War (last 
visited Jan. 27, 2007). 
 11. Treaty of Peace, China-Japan, Apr. 17, 1895, 181 Consol. T. S. 217, available at http://www. 
taiwandocuments.org/ shimonoseki01.htm (last visited Feb. 13, 2007).  
 12. Id. arts. 2(b) & (c). The text of the treaty reads, in relevant part:  
China [will] cede[] to Japan in perpetuity and full sovereignty the following territories, 
together with all fortifications, arsenals, and public property thereon . . . The island of 
[Taiwan], together with all islands appertaining or belonging to the said island of [Taiwan]. . . 
[and] [t]he Pescadores Group, that is to say, all islands lying between the 119th and 120th 
degrees of longitude east of Greenwich and the 23rd and 24th degrees of north latitude. 
Id.  
 13. Although the Taiwanese initially revolted against the Japanese, briefly changing the name 
territory from “Formosa” to “The Democratic Nation of Taiwan” and forming resistance forces, Japan 
still invested heavily in the infrastructure of the territory in order to exploit the territory’s resources 
and to “cement the island within its growing empire.” Christopher J. Carolan, The “Republic of 
Taiwan”: A Legal-Historical Justification for a Taiwanese Declaration of Independence, 75 N.Y.U. L. 
REV. 429, 432–33 & n.15 (2000); see also Administration of Taiwan in Recent Times—The Ch’ing 
Period, http://www.tpg.gov.tw/e-english/history/history-e-2_3.htm (last visited Feb. 13, 2007).  
 14. Carolan, supra note 13, at 433.  
 15. Cairo Communiqué, Dec. 1, 1943, http://www.ndl.go.jp/constitution/e/shiryo/01/002_46/ 
002_46tx.html. 
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communiqué was issued to “restrain and punish the aggression of 
Japan,”16 to demand the return of the land Japan had “stolen” from China 
and to call for Japan’s unconditional surrender.17 Two years later, the 
Three Great Allies and the Soviet Union again called for Japan’s 
unconditional surrender and the return of Taiwan to China in the Potsdam 
Proclamation of 1945.18 When Japan surrendered to the Allies in July of 
1945, Japan agreed to abide by the terms of the Potsdam Proclamation of 
1945.19 
Although seemingly simple, Japan’s agreement to abide by the terms of 
the Potsdam Proclamation had legal effects that remain unclear. Between 
1895, when the Treaty of Shimonoseki was signed, and 1945, when the 
Japanese surrendered in World War II, the Chinese national government 
had changed from that of the Ch’ing (or Qing) Dynasty to the Republic of 
China (ROC).20 Taiwan, having belonged to the Ch’ing Dynasty, had 
 
 
 16. Id. 
 17. Id. The full passage reads in pertinent part:  
The Three Great Allies are fighting this war to restrain and punish the aggression of Japan. 
They covet no gain for themselves and have no thought of territorial expansion. It is their 
purpose that Japan shall be stripped of all the islands in the Pacific which she has seized or 
occupied since the beginning of the first World War in 1914, and that all the territories Japan 
has stolen from the Chinese, such as Manchuria, Formosa, and The Pescadores, shall be 
restored to the Republic of China. Japan will also be expelled from all other territories which 
she has taken by violence and greed. The aforesaid three great powers, mindful of the 
enslavement of the people of Korea, are determined that in due course Korea shall become 
free and independent.  
 With these objects in view the three Allies, in harmony with those of the United Nations 
at war with Japan, will continue to persevere in the serious and prolonged operations 
necessary to procure the unconditional surrender of Japan. 
Id.  
 18. Proclamation Calling for the Surrender of Japan, Approved by the Heads of Governments of 
the U.S., China and the U.K., July 26, 1945, available at http://www.niraikanai.wwma.net/pages/ 
archive/potsdam.html. The Potsdam Declaration contained essentially the same terms as the Cairo 
Communiqué, and it incorporated the Cairo Communiqué by reference. See Cairo Communiqué, supra 
note 15. The only material difference between the Cairo Communiqué and the Potsdam Proclamation 
was that the Soviet Union was a party to the latter. See id.  
 19. Surrender by Japan. Terms Between the United States of America and the other Allied 
Powers and Japan, Sept. 2, 1945, 59 Stat. 1733.  
We, acting by command of and in behalf of the Emperor of Japan, the Japanese Government 
and the Japanese Imperial General Headquarters, hereby accept the provisions set forth in the 
declaration issued by the heads of the Governments of the United States, China and Great 
Britain on 26 July 1945, at Potsdam . . . 
Id. 
 20. During the end of the 1800s, China was experiencing increasing pressure from European 
imperialists to westernize. The Boxer Rebellion, http://www.smplanet.com/imperialism/fists.html (last 
visited Feb. 13, 2007). Several European countries (including Britain, Germany, Russia, and France) 
and Japan demanded that China allow foreign missionaries into the country, implement foreign 
legislation in Beijing, and open more ports of trade with the West. Id. The citizens of China soon 
became disenchanted with these pressures and began to lash out against western culture. Id. The 
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never formally recognized the ROC.21 It was unclear, therefore, whether 
Taiwan could be returned to a government of which it had never been a 
part.22  
Additionally, the document conceding Japan’s defeat was only a 
promise to abide by the Potsdam Proclamation.23 Being as such, the 
document neither legally ceded Taiwan to China, nor formally 
relinquished Japan’s control over the area.24 By the time that the 
Multilateral Peace Treaty of 1951 came into effect,25 officially signifying 
Japan’s relinquishment of sovereignty over Taiwan, China had a new non-
democratic government: the People’s Republic of China.26 China’s change 
of government presented democratic nations with two problems. First, the 
Allies intended to return Taiwan to the democratic ROC government27 and 
had attempted to aid the ROC in resisting the communist forces.28 Second, 
despite the fact that the ROC had been ousted from mainland China and 
had fled to Taiwan, both the P.R.C. and the ROC claimed to be the 
legitimate government of Taiwan.29 At this point, the international 
 
 
rejection of western culture culminated in the “Boxer Rebellion.” During the rebellion, there was 
wide-spread starvation, rape, murder, and general social unrest. Id. Prompted by rampant social unrest 
and the Boxer Rebellion, the revolutionary leader Sun Yat-Sen formed Tongmeng Hui (the “United 
League”) in 1905. Emergence of Modern China: III, http://www-chaos.umd.edu/history/modern3. 
html#republican (last visited Oct. 4, 2007). After a number of unsuccessful uprisings, the Tongmeng 
Hui, based on democracy, nationalism, and socialism, took over China in 1911. Id.  
 21. When Japan surrendered Taiwan to China, the constitution adopted by the Republic of China 
(ROC) had never been applied to Taiwan because Taiwan was under Japan’s control when the ROC 
took over. See Sean Cooney, Why Taiwan is not Hong Kong: A Review of the PRC’s “One Country 
Two Systems” Model for Reunification with Taiwan, 6 PAC. RIM L. & POL’Y J. 497, 514 (1997).  
 22. Id.  
 23. Because agreeing to the Potsdam Proclamation was a condition of surrender, China was not 
immediately given legal control over Taiwan, but rather took control over the territory on behalf of the 
Allies pending the territory’s ultimate disposition. Lung-Chu Chen, Taiwan’s Current International 
Legal Status, 32 NEW ENG. L. REV. 675, 677 (1998).  
 24. See id.  
 25. Treaty of Peace with Japan, Sept. 8, 1951, 3 U.S.T. 3169 (1952). The Treaty states that 
“Japan renounces all right, title and claim to [Taiwan] and the Pescadores.” Id. art. 2. The Multilateral 
Peace Treaty, although signed in 1951, did not enter into effect until April 28, 1952. Id.  
 26. Communist sentiment existed in China as early as 1919. JUNE TEUFEL DREYER, CHINA’S 
POLITICAL SYSTEM: MODERNIZATION AND TRADITION 63 (5th ed., Pearson Education, Inc. 2006). By 
the early 1900s, the communists and the Kuomintang (the modern democratic socialist party or KMT) 
were openly fighting over the control of the country. Id. at 67–72. Eventually, the communists, led by 
Mao Zedong, overthrew the KMT forces. Id. at 77–79. Zedong proclaimed the founding of the 
People’s Republic of China (P.R.C.) on October 1, 1949. Id. Meanwhile, the defeated ROC 
government fled to Taiwan. Id.  
 27. The ROC was the only official government of China while the Cairo Communiqué and the 
Potsdam Proclamation were in force. See Charney & Prescott, supra note 7, at 458.  
 28. The U.S. attempted to aid the ROC by sending its military to defend the ROC against the 
communists. See DREYER, supra note 26, at 78–79.  
 29. Although the ROC had been soundly defeated and retreated to Taiwan, the government 
refused to acknowledge defeat. Carolan, supra note 13, at 436. With no desire to formally recognize or 
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community was unclear as to which, if either, actually spoke for China.30 
Perhaps, due to these reasons, neither the ROC nor the P.R.C. were parties 
to the 1951 Multilateral Peace Treaty.31 The Multilateral Peace Treaty 
serves as the genesis of the dispute over Taiwan’s sovereignty,32 as its 
only significance is Japan’s formal renunciation of sovereignty over 
Taiwan.33  
A. The International Response to the Taiwan Question 
Following the Multilateral Peace Treaty, the United States34 responded 
to the prospect of the communist P.R.C. government’s acquisition of 
Taiwan with the 195435 Mutual Defense Treaty (MDT).36 The MDT called 
for both Taiwan and the U.S. to “resist communist subversive activities 
directed from without against their territorial integrity and political 
stability.”37 According to the MDT, Taiwan had the “inherent right to self 
defense.”38 
 
 
legitimize another communist country, the non-communist international community allowed the ROC 
to represent China in the United Nations (U.N.) until 1971. See id.; infra notes 42–43 and 
accompanying text.  
 30. Carolan, supra note 13. 
 31. Treaty of Peace with Japan, supra note 25. There were 48 parties to the Multilateral Peace 
Treaty of 1951, but neither China nor Taiwan numbered among them. Id. 
 32. Charney & Prescott, supra note 7, at 458–59. 
 33. See Eric Ting-Lun Huang, The Modern Concept of Sovereignty, Statehood and Recognition: 
A Case Study of Taiwan, 16 N.Y. INT’L L. REV. 99, 142 (2003). The Multilateral Peace Treaty does not 
specify to which country Taiwan was to be ceded. Id. Additionally, “[t]hat question was not clarified 
by the Bilateral Peace Treaty of 1952 between Japan and the ROC, which simply recognized Japan’s 
renunciation in the Multilateral Peace Treaty of 1951.” Charney & Prescott, supra note 7, at 458–59.  
 34. All though this section focuses on the broader international response to the Taiwan question, 
Taiwan’s international standing is heavily influenced by U.S. policy decisions. Huang, supra note 33, 
at 146 (noting the influence of U.S. policy on the international community’s perception of Taiwan). 
Therefore, this section focuses heavily on U.S. response to the Taiwan question. 
 35. The U.S. waited for two years to enact the Mutual Defense Treaty (MDT) because, although 
there were indications that Mao Zedong and the communists intended to invade Taiwan, the P.R.C. 
chose to focus on more pressing concerns. See Carolan, supra note 13, at 437. It also took time for the 
U.S. to realize that, with the beginning of the Korean War and the ongoing Cold War, the democratic 
ROC would play an important part in the U.S.’s strategy in East Asia. Id. at 437 & n.48.  
 36. Mutual Defense Treaty Between the United States of America and the Republic of China, 
Dec. 2, 1954, U.S.-P.R.C. 6 U.S.T. 433.  
 37. Id. art. II. The entire passage reads:  
In order more effectively to achieve the objective of this Treaty, the Parties separately and 
jointly by self-help and mutual aid will maintain and develop their individual and collective 
capacity to resist armed attack and communist subversive activities directed from without 
against their territorial integrity and political stability. 
Id.  
 38. Id. art. X. According to the MDT, this was because the ROC had possession and control of 
all of the territories listed therein. Id.  
Washington University Open Scholarship
p 405 Dupree book pages.doc10/12/2007  
 
 
 
 
 
410 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY GLOBAL STUDIES LAW REVIEW [VOL. 6:405 
 
 
 
 
It also granted the United States the right to use “land, air and sea forces in 
. . . Taiwan . . . as may be used for their defense.”39 Following enactment 
of the MDT, the U.S. stationed “significant military sources in Taiwan and 
provided aid to the ROC when the P.R.C. attempted to seize several 
contested islands in the Strait of Taiwan.”40  
The MDT lasted for seventeen years, until Taiwan’s international status 
changed significantly. Up until that point, both the P.R.C. (in mainland 
China) and the ROC (in Taiwan) had claimed to be the legitimate 
government of China.41 Despite this fact, the ROC was the government 
that represented China before the United Nations (U.N.).42 In 1971, 
however, the U.N. changed its course43 by formally recognizing the P.R.C. 
as the sole government of China.44 This effectively expelled Taiwan from 
the U.N.45 Following its expulsion, Taiwan was marginalized in the 
international community due to China’s political maneuvering46 and the 
 
 
 39. Id. art. VII.  
 40. Jason X. Hamilton, An Overview of the Legal and Security Questions Concerning Taiwanese 
Independence, 1 LOY. U. CHI. INT’L L. REV. 91, 92 (2005); Colin P. A. Jones, The United States Arms 
Exports to Taiwan Under the Taiwan Relations Act: The Failed Role of Law in United States Foreign 
Relations, 9 CONN. J. INT’L L. 51, 52 (1993) (noting that the U.S. aided in defending the shore islands 
of Quemoy and Matsu against invasion from the P.R.C.).  
 41. GEORGE H. KERR, FORMOSA BETRAYED 434–50 (Houghton Mifflin 1965) (discussing the 
emergence of two Chinas in the international community); see supra text accompanying notes 26–31.  
 42. The role of the ROC as sole representative of China in the U.N. was curious considering that 
the ROC had long since been relegated to the small island territory of Taiwan. See supra text 
accompanying notes 27–31. 
 43. There is evidence that President Nixon led the international community toward the policy 
change to introduce “a new geopolitical counterweight to the Soviet power.” See Hamilton, supra note 
40, at 93. The international policy shift came during the period when the Sino-Soviet split was 
reaching a boiling point. See Britannica.com, The American Experience: Nixon’s China Game 
www.pbs.org/wgbh/amex/china/peopleevents/pande06.html (last visited Mar. 9, 2006).  
 44.  
The General Assembly . . . Recognizing that the representatives of the Government of the 
People’s Republic of China are the only lawful representatives of China to the United 
Nations. . . Decides to restore all its rights to the People’s Republic of China and to recognize 
the representatives of its Government as the only legitimate representatives of China to the 
United Nations, and to expel forthwith the representatives of [the ROC] from the place which 
they unlawfully occupy at the United Nations and in all the organizations related to it.  
Restoration of the Lawful Rights of the People’s Republic of China in the United Nations, G.A. Res. 
2758, U.N. GAOR, 26th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/8429 (1971) (emphasis added), available at http://www. 
un.org.documents/ga/res/26/ares26.htm (follow “2758 (XXVI)” hyperlink). The phrase “and all the 
organizations related to it” in the resolution excluded Taiwan from organizations such as the World 
Health Organization (WHO), the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and a host of other 
environmental, human rights, and drug control organizations associated with the U.N. See Request for 
the inclusion of an item in the provisional agenda of the fifty-third session, http://www.un.org/ 
documents/ga/docs/53/plenary/a53-145.htm (last visited Oct. 4, 2007).  
 45. Id. 
 46. After entering the U.N., China blocked Taiwan’s entrance into the U.N. and several other 
international organizations. Huang, supra note 33, at 146. China also mandated that the ROC “and all 
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international community’s desire to increase diplomatic relations with 
China.47 In 1979, the U.S. formally recognized the P.R.C. as the sole 
government of China48 and subsequently terminated the MDT.49  
B. Chinese Aggression from the 1950s–1970s 
In viewing the Sino-Taiwanese relationship from the early 1950s to the 
late 1970s, it is important to note that the P.R.C. was relatively passive in 
asserting its claim of sovereignty over Taiwan.50 There are several reasons 
for China’s behavior during this period. First, when the MDT was in effect 
(1954–1971), a full scale invasion of Taiwan was unrealistic.51 During that 
period, the U.S. military’s presence in Taiwan was significant.52 The 
P.R.C. would have needed strong support, most likely from the Soviet 
Union, which it did not have.53 Second, a military campaign, even with 
 
 
organizations related to it” language appear in the resolution excluding Taiwan from the U.N. See id. 
at n.305.  
 47. For instance, following the P.R.C.’s entrance into the U.N., President Nixon, the first U.S. 
president to visit the P.R.C., issued the Shanghai Communiqué. Joint Communiqué Between the 
United States of America and the People’s Republic of China, Feb. 28, 1972, http://china.org.cn/ 
english/china-us/26012.htm. In the Shanghai Communiqué, the U.S. stated, inter alia, that it would 
“progressively reduce its forces and military installations on Taiwan,” and that its ultimate goal is 
“withdrawal of all US forces and military installations from Taiwan.” Id. art. 12. The countries also 
stated their intent to increase bilateral trade. Id. art. 13. The Shanghai Communiqué was the first 
attempt the U.S. made to “normalize” its relationship with the P.R.C. See Carolan, supra note 13, at 
437.  
 48. See The Joint Communiqué on the Establishment of Diplomatic Relations Between the 
People’s Republic of China and the United States of America, Jan. 1, 1979, http://www.china.org.cn/ 
english/china-us/26243.htm. The communiqué states that “[t]he United States of America recognizes 
the Government of the People’s Republic of China as the sole legal Government of China.” Id. 
(emphasis added). However, “[i]t is important to underscore that the United States consistently has 
stopped short of endorsing the P.R.C.’s claim that Taiwan is part of China.” Carolan, supra note 13, at 
438 (emphasis added). The United States has only acknowledged China’s claim of sovereignty. See id.  
 49. See Jones, supra note 40, at 53. Although the U.S. terminated the MDT, it enacted the 
Taiwan Relations Act in its place. See Taiwan Relations Act, Pub. L. No. 96–8, 93 Stat. 14 (1979) 
(codified as amended at 22 U.S.C. § 3301 (2004)). The Taiwan Relations Act retains the U.S.’s right to 
“provide Taiwan with arms of a defensive character; and to maintain the capacity of the United States 
to resist any resort to force or other forms of coercion that would jeopardize the security, or the social 
or economic system, of the people on Taiwan.” Id.  
 50. See infra notes 51–59 and accompanying text. Although China attempted to overtake two 
islands (Quemoy and Matsu) in the Taiwan Strait, in 1954, 1958, and 1962, these islands were 
relatively small and very close to Mainland China. See Jones, supra note 40, at 52 & n.8; First Taiwan 
Strait Crisis Quemoy and Matsu Islands, http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/quemoy_ 
matsu.htm (last visited Mar. 23, 2006). In addition, China was responding to an impending attack from 
the deposed ROC government. First Taiwan Strait Crisis Quemoy and Matsu Islands, supra.  
 51. Zhengyuan Fu, China’s Perception of the Taiwan Issue, 1 UCLA J. INT’L L. & FOREIGN AFF. 
321, 325 (1996–1997).  
 52. See id. 
 53. See id.  
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Soviet aid, would have been very costly to the P.R.C. government.54 
Finally, although the P.R.C. firmly believed that there was “one China,” 
Mao Zedong expressed little urgency in reunification with Taiwan.55 
According to him, Taiwan would eventually be “liberated.”56 
The P.R.C.’s passiveness on reunification during this period is an 
important backdrop from which to gauge the effects of increasing 
capitalism on the P.R.C. perception of the Taiwan question. In the next 
part, this Note explores both China’s increasing market capitalism and its 
increasing aggression toward Taiwan.  
II. INCREASING CAPITALISM AND INCREASING AGGRESSION 
In the late 1970s, China underwent changes that drastically shifted its 
policy, both in regards to market capitalism and the Taiwan question. 
Before this period, China’s economy followed Marxist social doctrine 
under Mao Zedong’s leadership.57 Following Mao’s death in September 
1976, however, China’s economic ideology shifted.58 This economic shift, 
although initially distinct from the Taiwan question, would later have a 
direct effect on China’s “One China” policy.59 
A. The Shift to Capitalism: 1970s–Present 
In the late 1970s, China began reinterpreting and modernizing 
fundamental principles of its communist doctrine in order to gain more 
economic flexibility. In 1978, Mao Zedong’s successor, Deng Xioping,60 
 
 
 54. See id. 
 55. Mao Zedong once said, “We do not want to take over Taiwan . . . all at once. [Taiwan can 
remain] in the hands of [the ROC], and it does not matter if this be ten years, twenty years, or thirty 
years.” Id. at 325–26. Also, according to Henry Kissinger, “[n]either then, nor in any subsequent 
meeting, did Mao indicate any impatience over Taiwan, set any time limits, make any threats, or treat 
it as the touchstone of [the Sino-U.S.] relationship.” Id. at 326.  
 56. See Fu, supra note 51, at 325–26. 
 57. During the time that Mao Zedong was the Chairman of the Central Committee of the 
Communist Party of China, he adhered strictly to the Marxist principles of state control of the means 
of production, socialist policy-driven economic decisions, a limited private sector, and egalitarianism. 
See WEN-SHUN CHI, IDEOLOGICAL CONFLICTS IN MODERN CHINA: DEMOCRACY AND 
AUTHORITARIANISM 254–58 (Transaction Publishers 1992) (1986); DREYER, supra note 26, at 145–
46, 148. These policies isolated China, in many respects, from engaging in meaningful international 
trade relationships. See DREYER, supra note 26, at 148–49.  
 58. See infra notes 60–93 and accompanying text. 
 59. See infra notes 86–123 and accompanying text. 
 60. Deng Xioping was very critical of the way the economy had been run under Mao. DREYER, 
supra note 26, at 149.  
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introduced a plan called the “Four Modernizations.”61 This plan was 
introduced to “reform . . . the planning and management systems in 
industry and agriculture” in China.62 The first initiative was to increase 
personal responsibility in unproductive agricultural areas.63 To accomplish 
this task, China reduced mandatory production quotas, reduced the amount 
of crops that had to be sold to the state, and encouraged open market crop 
sales.64 Second, China reinterpreted its socialist land-use doctrine to allow 
flexibility in land transfers and to encourage business investment in urban 
areas.65 Third, Xioping decentralized economic authority to state 
enterprises, thereby allowing the states to drastically increase efficiency.66 
In the last of the “Four Modernizations,” Xioping moved China’s state-set 
pricing system toward a system driven by market demand.67 By the late 
1980s, China had implemented each of these policies on a large scale,68 
and the economy was experiencing great progress.69 
 
 
 61. Id.  
 62. Id.  
 63. During the Maoist era, farmers had little economic incentive to grow crops because they were 
required to sell the vast majority of them to the state at state-set prices. See DREYER, supra note 26, at 
149. The state-set prices were often much lower than what the crops would have gotten on the open 
market. See id. at 149–52. 
 64. Id. 
 65. Under Mao, China closely adhered to Marxist doctrine that “land [was] not a commodity and 
that it [had] no exchange value because it exists naturally and is not the product of labor.” Pamela N. 
Phan, Enriching the Land or the Political Elite? Lessons from China on Democratization of the Urban 
Renewal Process, 14 PAC. RIM L. & POL’Y J. 607, 611 (2005). Following this doctrine, China kept 
strict controls over land and avoided leasing it to individuals or businesses. Id. However, by 
reinterpreting Marx’s writing in the 1980s, China determined that, although land itself could not be 
commoditized, its underlying value could. Id. This ideology shift allowed China to retain a Marxist 
philosophy, while increasing its flexibility in granting land rights for social and economic purposes. 
See id.  
 66. Before the policy shift towards market capitalism, states would subsidize unprofitable 
businesses. See DREYER, supra note 26, at 151–52. These businesses, hailed as the antithesis of 
capitalism, were largely unproductive because of the lack of incentives for workers. Id. at 147. 
Beginning in 1979, China instituted decentralization efforts. Id. at 152. The states, realizing that their 
successes or failures were in their own hands, lowered production quotas, instituted taxes instead of 
requiring business to turn over their profits, and dismantled unprofitable businesses. Id. at 152–53.  
 67. Under the Maoist regime of government set prices, market prices were unknown to the 
Chinese public. See id. at 155. Xioping initially introduced a two-tier pricing system, and eventually 
phased out state-set prices. Id. at 153–55.  
 68. First, in regard to agriculture, China loosened restrictions on production quotas, encouraged 
citizens to sell crops on the open market, increased the amount of credit that was available for 
agricultural investment, and increased the state procurement prices for crops that were sold under the 
quota system. DREYER, supra note 26, at 149–51. Second, private businesses were encouraged to enter 
into urban areas by attractive and previously unavailable land leasing options and by direct appeals to 
individuals to start their own businesses. See Phan, supra note 65, at 611–12. Third, the government 
began to delegate fiscal responsibility to individual states, and simplify administrative organizations. 
DREYER, supra note 26, at 152–53. States, in turn, lowered state-imposed mandatory quotas on factory 
production, stopped requiring business to turn over their profits to the state, and created bankruptcy 
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In 1988, China made two constitutional amendments to fully effectuate 
the new economic polices.70 The first article of amendment was intended 
to legitimize the private sector of the economy.71 The amendment 
explicitly noted the importance of the private sector, and called it a 
“complement” to the socialist economy.72 The second article of 
amendment explicitly authorized the lawful transfer of land, a privilege 
neglected by the previous constitution.73 No other amendments were made 
that year.74  
During the 1990s, China’s economy continued to experience great 
progress due to the continual reform of Chinese economic policy.75 
Although the country initially experienced a slight economic downturn, 
partially due to an international backlash against the 1989 Tiananmen 
Square incident,76 the policies that China implemented in the 1980s proved 
effective.77 In 1992, China “declared its intention to establish a ‘socialist 
 
 
laws. Id. These changes heavily incentivized investment in capital for future production. See id. Last, 
China gradually reformed the centralized pricing system in favor of a system based on supply and 
demand. Id. at 153–55. This change brought the economy more in line with market forces.  
 69. See EconomyWatch.com, China Economy, http://www.economywatch.com/world_economy/ 
china/index.html (last visited Mar. 23, 2007) (discussing the historical progress of China’s economy).  
 70. See XIAN FA arts. 11, 13 (1988) (P.R.C.), available at http://english.people.com.cn/ 
constitution/constitution.htm; M. Ulric Killion, China’s Amended Constitution: Quest for Liberty and 
Independent Judicial Review, 4 WASH. U. GLOBAL STUD. L. REV. 43, 56 (2005).  
 71. See XIAN FA art. 11 (1988) (P.R.C.).  
 72. Id. The following paragraph was added to Article 11 of the 1982 Constitution:  
The state permits the private sector of the economy to exist and develop within the limits 
prescribed by law. The private sector of the economy is a complement to the socialist public 
economy. The state protects the lawful rights and interests of the private sector of the 
economy, and exercises guidance, supervision and control over the private sector of the 
economy.  
China’s Constitutional Framework, http://www.cecc.gov/pages/virtualAcad/gov/stateconst.php (last 
visited Mar. 23, 2007). 
 73. XIAN FA art. 10 (1988). The fourth paragraph of article 10, which previously read “no 
organization or individual may appropriate, buy, sell or lease land, or unlawfully transfer land in other 
ways,” was amended to read “[n]o organization or individual may appropriate, buy, sell or unlawfully 
transfer land in other ways. The right to the use of the land may be transferred in accordance with the 
law.” See China’s Constitutional Framework, supra note 72. 
 74. See id. 
 75. See DREYER, supra note 26, at 155–66.  
 76. The Tiananmen Square incident began when students, dissatisfied with the P.R.C. 
government, protested, demanding democracy, freedom, and economic reform. See Tiananmen 
Square, 1989: The Declassified History, http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB16/ 
documents/index.html #12-29. On June 4, 1989, the P.R.C. brutally suppressed these protesters, killing 
between 180 and 500 students and injuring thousands more. Id. Because of these actions, the U.S. and 
many other countries imposed various sanctions on the P.R.C. Id.; DREYER, supra note 26, at 156.  
 77. China’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP) grew 5.2% in 1991 and 7% in 1992, each year 
having low levels of inflation. DREYER, supra note 26, at 156. China’s economic reforms were not, 
however, without drawbacks. From 1989 to 1991, China struggled with rising inflation, unequal 
distribution of income, and relatively low economic growth. See id.  
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market economic system.’”78 Commentators have interpreted this 
seemingly-contradictory statement to mean that China wanted to “use[] the 
advantages of capitalist market economies in order to develop socialized, 
large-scale production ‘while maintaining a balance of social and 
efficiency between the two.’”79 In 1993, China amended articles 3 through 
11 of the 1982 Constitution.80 Like the 1988 amendments, these 
amendments dealt mostly with economic issues.81 In the most extreme 
amendment, China declared that its economy was “socialist market 
economy.”82 The P.R.C. amended the 1982 Constitution again in 1999,83 
declaring that China’s private and other non-public economies were “an 
important component” of the market economy rather than a “complement 
of the socialist economy.”84 By the end of the 1990s, China’s gross 
domestic product (GDP) was equivalent to about one trillion U.S. 
dollars.85 
As a result of its progress toward free market capitalism, China now 
has the fourth largest economy in the world.86 2005 marked the third 
consecutive year that China’s economy grew at an annual rate of roughly 
ten percent.87 China has also formed strategic economic relationships with 
many countries around the world.88 In 2001, it became an official member 
of the World Trade Organization (WTO),89 solidifying its desire to engage 
 
 
 78. DREYER, supra note 26, at 157.  
 79. Id. at 157–58. 
 80. XIAN FA (1993) (P.R.C.); Killion, supra note 70, at 56.  
 81. Killion, supra note 70, at 56; see also China’s Constitutional Framework, supra note 72 
(discussing, section-by-section, the 1993 amendments to the 1982 Constitution).  
 82. XIAN FA art. 7 (1993) (P.R.C.) (emphasis added); see also China’s Constitution Framework, 
supra note 72.  
 83. XIAN FA (1999) (P.R.C.); Killion, supra note 70, at 56.  
 84. XIAN FA art. 7 (1999) (P.R.C.); Amendment Three, http://www.china.org.cn/english/features/ 
89052.htm (last visited Mar. 23, 2007). Compare this with the previous constitution. 
 85. DREYER, supra note 26, at 169. Gross domestic product (GDP) is a measure of all of the 
goods and services produced in a given economy. It is generally considered to be a good indicator of 
economic well-being. Id.  
 86. At the end of 2005, China’s economy was outpaced only by the economies of the U.S., 
Japan, and Germany, respectively. Economy in China is No. 4 in the World, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 25, 
2006, at C10. In terms of purchase power parity (ppp), in 2006, China had the second largest economy 
in the world, behind that of the U.S. CIA.gov, CIA—World Factbook, https://www.cia.gov/cia/ 
publications/factbook/geos/ch.html (last visited Mar. 9, 2006).  
 87. See supra note 86. 
 88. See Juan Vega, China’s Economic and Political Clout Grows in Latin America at the 
Expense of U.S. Interests, 14 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 377, 385–414 (2005) (discussing China’s 
growing economic influence in countries such as Mexico, Brazil, Venezuela, Columbia, Bolivia, Peru, 
Nicaragua, Ecuador, Cuba, and a host of other countries in the southern hemisphere).  
 89. See John Waggoner, WTO admits China, Taiwan as members, U.S.A. TODAY, Nov. 12, 
2001, at 01B. 
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in international free trade90 and its status as a global economic leader.91 
Some economists believe that, with further economic reforms,92 China 
could have the world’s largest economy in the near future.93  
B. Increasing Aggression: 1970s–Present 
During the same time that China was experiencing a drastic shift 
toward free market capitalism, China’s policy on the Taiwan question 
changed as well. Although the U.S. terminated the MDT in 1979, it still 
maintained unofficial relations with Taiwan94 and continued to sell Taiwan 
weapons “of a defensive character.”95 Although China had been tolerant of 
this relationship, in the early 1980s it began insisting that the U.S. halt 
these weapons sales.96 During this period, the U.S. hoped to maintain 
Sino-U.S. diplomatic relations “in order to limit the Soviet Union’s 
opportunities for exploiting its military power [in Asia]”97 and this gave 
China leverage in its demand.98 After China’s initial demands, the U.S. 
momentarily considered selling arms to both China and Taiwan,99 but 
 
 
 90. The WTO is an organization that is dedicated to facilitating international free market trade. 
See WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, 10 BENEFITS OF THE WTO TRADING SYSTEM 1–18 (2003), 
http://www.wto.org/english/res_e/doload_e/10b_e.pdf.  
 91. China’s economy is intimately tied to the world economy. Nations around the world, 
especially the U.S., watch China closely. A downturn in China’s economy means a downturn for the 
world economy. For instance, China has collected about 800 billion U.S. dollars. If China were to sell 
the U.S. dollar, this would drastically affect the U.S. economy, vastly eroding the value of the dollar. 
See, Central Banks Dump Dollar for Euro, http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Global_Economy/ 
GA27Dj01.html (last visited Mar. 23, 2007).  
 92. See infra notes 185–96 and accompanying text.  
 93. See China to Become World’s Largest Economic Entity by 2030, PEOPLE’S DAILY ONLINE, 
http://english.people.com.cn/200501/12/eng20050112_170361.html (last visited Mar. 23, 2007); 
Wayne M. Morrison, China’s Economic Condition, FAS.ORG, Jan. 12, 2006, available at 
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/IB98014.pdf (noting that China might soon become the largest 
economy in the world).  
 94. See supra note 49.  
 95. Id.  
 96. John Holdridge, United States Assistant Secretary for East Asia and Pacific Affairs, testified 
in a Congressional hearing that “The Chinese [have] insisted. . . that we agree to the ultimate 
termination of arms sales [to Taiwan].” Y. Frank Chiang, One-China Policy and Taiwan, 28 FORDHAM 
INT’L L.J. 1, 56 (2004) (citing John H. Holdrigde, U.S.-China Joint Communiqué, Statement Before 
the House Foreign Affairs Committee (Aug. 18, 1982), in DEP’T ST. BULL., Oct. 1982, at 19).  
 97. Id.  
 98. See id. 
 99. Id. at 55 (citing John H. Holdridge, U.S. Relations With China, Address before the House 
Foreign Affairs Committee (July 16, 1981), in DEP’T ST. BULL., Oct. 1981, at 38). “The U.S.-China 
relationship is a major component in our global and regional security policies . . . we concluded that 
we should revise the international traffic in arms to permit the licensing of commercial sales to China 
on a case-by-case basis.” Id.  
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ultimately decided against that course of action.100 The U.S. also decided 
against discounting arms sales to Taiwan101 but it did, however, issue a 
joint statement with China declaring that “territorial integrity and non-
interference in each other’s internal affairs constitute the fundamental 
principles guiding U.S. China relations.”102  
During the 1990s, China became increasingly vocal and aggressive in 
its claim of sovereignty over Taiwan. In 1993, the same year that China 
amended its 1982 Constitution,103 the P.R.C. issued a White Paper 
reiterating its plan for peaceful reunification with Taiwan.104 The White 
Paper also claimed however, that China “[was] entitled to use any means it 
deem[ed] necessary, including military ones, to uphold its sovereignty and 
territorial integrity.”105 In the mid-1990s, the Taiwanese people 
increasingly supported a declaration of independence from mainland 
China.106 In 1995, China responded by closing “unofficial” reunification 
negotiations with the territory.107 The following year, China conducted 
military exercises less than 50 miles from Taiwan’s coast, firing several 
missiles towards the territory.108 These military exercises took place 
during Taiwan’s first direct democratic election109 and were possibly 
intended to intimidate Taiwanese voters.110 Although the newly-elected 
 
 
 100. “We refused [to discontinue weapon sales to Taiwan] because the level of our arms sales 
must be determined by the needs of Taiwan, and we could not agree to a termination date, as the 
Chinese demanded, which might impair our ability to meet those needs.” Id. at 56. 
 101. Following the U.S.’s joint statement with China, China wanted the U.S. to discontinue arms 
sales to Taiwan. Conversely, Taiwan asked the U.S. to agree to “the six assurances.” See Six 
Assurances, http://www.orechinacommittee.org/sixassurances.htm (last visited Mar. 23, 2007).  
 102. Joint Communication of the United States of America and the People’s Republic of China, 
Aug. 17, 1982, available at http://www.usinfo.state.gov/eap/Archive_Index/Joint_communique_1982. 
html.  
 103. See supra notes 80–84 and accompanying text.  
 104. CCP White Paper on The Taiwan Question and Reunification of China, art. II [hereinafter 
CCP White Paper], http://www.china.org.cn/e-white/taiwan/10-3.htm (last visited Oct. 4, 2007); see 
also China’s Plan for Reunification, infra notes 122–49 and accompanying text.  
 105. CCP White Paper on the Taiwan Question and Reunification, art. III, available at 
http://www.china.org.cn/e-white/taiwan/10-4.htm.  
 106. See China-Taiwan History, http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/asia/china/china-taiwan.html 
(last visited Mar. 23, 2007).  
 107. See Lauren Eyton, Taiwan-China Progress at a Glacial Pace, ASIA TIMES, Jan. 21, 2005, 
available at http://www.atimes.com/atimes/China/GA21Ad01.html (last visited Mar. 23, 2007). China 
claimed it discontinued the negotiations because Taiwan had been attempting to expand its ties with 
the international community. Id.  
 108. Fu, supra note 51, at 321.  
 109. Taiwan Communiqué No. 71, June 1996, available at http://www.taiwandc.org/twcom/71-
no2.htm (last visited Mar. 23, 2007). 
 110. Taiwan Angered by China’s ‘Threats,’ CNN Interactive World News, Feb. 6, 1996, available 
at http://cnn.tv/WORLD/9602/china_taiwan. During the elections, China issued statements lambasting 
Taiwan’s leading candidates and accusing them of attempting to divide China. Id. The leading 
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President Lee Ting-Hui made conciliatory gestures in order to avoid 
military engagement,111 tension between China and Taiwan remained high 
throughout the 1990s.112 
The relationship between China and Taiwan is still tense at the time of 
this writing. In 2000, China threatened military action if the Taiwanese 
people elected Chen Shui-bian, a supporter of Taiwan’s independence, as 
their president.113 Chen was eventually elected, and, even though he 
moderated his position on reunification,114 China reiterated it would 
“never allow independence for Taiwan.”115 China also warned foreign 
nations that reunification was a domestic issue in order to avoid 
international scrutiny.116 In December 2004, the Standing Committee of 
the National People’s Congress announced its intention to include an anti-
secession law in its legislative agenda.117 The law was introduced in 
reaction to “secessionist activities . . . [that] gravely threaten China’s 
sovereignty and territorial integrity”118 and contemplated the use of force 
against Taiwan.119 Following the adoption of the anti-secession law in 
March of 2005, China threatened Taiwan with “disaster” if it ceased plans 
to resume reunification negotiations.120 Currently, China has over 700 
missiles pointed at various locations in Taiwan.121 
 
 
candidate, Lee Ting-Hui, believed in Taiwan’s independence from China, and later became Taiwan’s 
president. Fu, supra note 51, at 321.  
 111. See Fu, supra note 51, at 321; see also Taiwan Angered by China’s ‘Threats,’ supra note 
110. 
 112. See infra notes 113–21 and accompanying text.  
 113. Milestone in China-Taiwan Ties, BBC News World Edition, Mar. 19, 2000, available at 
http://news. bbc.co.uk/2/hi/world/asia-pacific/682686.stm.  
 114. See id. “Mr. Chen gradually moderated his policies towards China and said explicitly he 
would not declare independence if elected and would be prepared to discuss any issue with Beijing.” 
Id. 
 115. China: No Independence for Taiwan, CNN, http://www.cnn.com/2005/WORLD/asjapcf/03/ 
05/china.npc/index.html.  
 116. See China’s Hu Warns ‘Bullying Nations,’ BBC News World Edition, Apr. 24, 2002, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/asia-pacific/1947977.stm; China’s Hu Warns US Over Taiwan, BBC 
News World Edition, May 2, 2002, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/ world/asia-pacific/1963389.stm; China-
Taiwan: Coercion or Deterrence, BBC News World Edition, July 13, 2002, http://news.bbc.co.uk/ 
2/hi/asia-pacific/2126226.stm.  
 117. Ralph A. Sossa, Much Ado About China’s Anti-Secession Law, ASIA TIMES, Mar. 5, 2005, 
available at http://www.atimes.com/atimes/China/GC05Ad02.html; China’s Anti-Secession Law, 
http://www.taiwandc.org/aslaw-main.htm (last visited Mar. 23, 2007).  
 118. Draft Anti-Secession Law Explained, http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/english/doc/2005-03/08/ 
content_422875.htm (translating vice-chairman of the Standing Committee, Wang Zhaoguo’s, 
explanation of the draft Anti-Secession Law).  
 119. See id.  
 120. In 2006, Taiwan withdrew from reunification discussions with China due to China’s military 
threat. See China Warns Taiwan of ‘Disaster,’ BBC News, Feb. 28, 2006, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/ 
hi/asia-pacific/4757568.stm. China threatened Taiwan with military action because of Taiwan’s 
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III. CHINA’S PLAN FOR REUNIFICATION 
The P.R.C.’s plan for reunification with Taiwan links its increasing 
market capitalism to its escalating aggression towards Taiwan. China 
discussed this plan, which is described as “one country, two systems” 
(OCTS), in a 1993 White Paper intended to settle the Taiwan question.122 
The two tenets of the White Paper are: (1) the peaceful reunification of 
Taiwan with mainland China; and (2) one country with two separate 
economic systems.123  
The White Paper cited numerous instances, dating back to the early 
1950s, where P.R.C. expressed a desire to peacefully reunite with 
Taiwan.124 The document then reaffirmed China’s position: that Taiwan is 
an integral part of China and that China will not recognize any attempt to 
separate Taiwan from China.125  
Moreover, the White Paper asserted China’s theory of “side by side” 
coexisting political systems,126 encompassing both China’s socialist 
system and Taiwan’s capitalist system.127 The White Paper asserts that 
 
 
decision to disband the counsel on reunification, but China did not indicate when or how military 
action would commence. Id.  
 121. Id. 
 122. See supra note 104, art. III. 
 123. See id.  
 124. Id. The first such attempt mentioned was a 1955 statement by then-premier Zhou Enlai, who 
affirmed that a reunification of Taiwan and mainland China would try to be carried out by peaceful 
means. Id. Second, the White Paper notes that Mao Zedong, in 1956, thought that a peaceful 
reunification was “the best option.” Id. The document goes on to say that Deng Xiaoping, in 1983, was 
also a proponent of peaceful reunification. Id.  
 125. Id. The passage reads: “There is only one China in the world, Taiwan is an inalienable part of 
China . . . . The Chinese Government is firmly against any words or deeds designed to split China’s 
sovereignty and territorial integrity. It opposes ‘two Chinas’, ‘one China, one Taiwan’, ‘one country, 
two governments’ or any attempt or act that could lead to ‘independence of Taiwan’.” Id. The 
document goes on to state that, despite China’s desire to reunify with Taiwan by peaceful means, the 
country does reserve the right to use military action against Taiwan. Id. This statement makes it clear 
that peaceful methods are not China’s only option for reunification; they are just the preferred method. 
See supra notes 113–17 and accompanying text.  
 126. CCP White Paper, supra note 104, art. III, § 2.  
 127. Id. The passage states:  
On the premise of one China, socialism on the mainland and capitalism on Taiwan can 
coexist and develop side by side for a long time without one swallowing up the other. This 
concept has largely taken account of the actual situation in Taiwan and practical interests of 
our compatriots there. It will be a unique feature and important innovation in the state system 
of a reunified China. 
After reunification, Taiwan’s current socio-economic system, its way of life as well as 
economic and cultural ties with foreign countries can remain unchanged. Private property, 
including houses and land, as well as business ownership, legal inheritance and overseas 
Chinese and foreign investments on the island will all be protected by law. 
Id.  
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capitalism is integral to Taiwan, and that the coexistent system would be a 
beneficial “innovation” for both China and Taiwan.128 Also, the document 
explicitly stated that China would not alter any rights under Taiwan’s 
current system, including property rights, business ownership, legal 
inheritance, and foreign investment.129 All of these rights would be 
protected by law.130 Last, and perhaps most significantly, China’s plan 
called for a “high degree of autonomy” for Taiwan.131 China stipulated 
that it would only govern Taiwan as an “administrative region” and that 
Taiwan could continue to run its own economic affairs in addition to 
keeping an independent judiciary, military forces, and political parties.132 
China also promised that representatives from Taiwan could “be appointed 
to senior posts in the central government and participate in the running of 
national affairs.”133 Although China has not set out a specific plan for how 
the “one country, two systems” model would work,134 a similar application 
of the system in Hong Kong may provide insight.135  
A. Case Study: The Hong Kong Administrative Region 
In 1997, China took control over Hong Kong under the OCTS 
model.136 The OCTS model has been applied to Hong Kong in a way 
similar to the plan detailed in the 1993 White Paper.137 The similarities 
between Hong Kong and Taiwan are such that Hong Kong may be 
considered a test-run for Taiwan.138 Hong Kong was ceded in perpetuity, 
like Taiwan, to the British in 1842.139 Before 1997, the British ruled Hong 
Kong in a manner comparable to the martial law Taiwan experienced until 
 
 
 128. Id. 
 129. Id. 
 130. Id.  
 131. CCP White Paper, supra note 104, art. III, § 3. 
 132. Id.  
 133. Id.  
 134. CCP White Paper, supra note 104.  
 135. See infra notes 136–74 and accompanying text. 
 136. Jacques deLisle & Kevin P. Lane, Hong Kong Endgame and the Rule of Law (II): The Battle 
Over “The People” and the Business Community in the Transition to Chinese Rule, 25 U. PA. J. INT’L 
ECON. L. 1525, 1525 (2004).  
 137. See supra notes 124–36 and accompanying text; see also infra notes 138–47 and 
accompanying text.  
 138. Cooney, supra note 21, at 498–502.  
 139. Hong Kong was ceded to the British in 1842, under the Treaty of Nanking, as a result of the 
Opium War. Michael D. Landry, International Agreements-Joint Declaration of the Government of the 
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Government of the People’s Republic 
of China on the Question of Hong Kong, 26 HARV. INT’L L.J. 249, 251 (1985). 
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1987.140 Also, Hong Kong, like Taiwan, practiced, and continues to 
practice, market capitalism.141  
When Hong Kong was turned over to China pursuant to an agreement 
with the British,142 China decided that it would be ruled as the Hong Kong 
Special Administrative Region (HKSAR).143 To protect the autonomy of 
this region, China enacted the Basic Law,144 which provided Hong Kong 
with a “high degree of autonomy . . . executive, legislative, and 
independent judicial power, including that of final adjudication . . . .”145 
The Basic Law also covers broad areas in which Hong Kong enjoys 
independent decision-making.146 However, Hong Kong remains limited. 
For instance, the HKSAR is not allowed to maintain its own military,147 
the executive branch of HKSAR has limited accountability,148 and the 
P.R.C. may apply its laws to HKSAR in times of “turmoil.”149  
 
 
 140. Cooney, supra note 21, at 511. Under British rule, Hong Kong’s constitution could be 
amended, at any time, by the British and without Hong Kong’s permission. Id. The political system 
was not democratic, and the head of the executive branch was appointed by the British and had to 
implement British directives. Id. The legislative branch of the government was also largely controlled 
by the British. Id. at 511–12.  
 141. See Robert A. Peterson, Lessons in Liberty: Hong Kong, “Crown Jewel” of Capitalism, 40 
THE FREEMAN 16, 16–22 (1990) (discussing the history of Hong Kong’s free market economy).  
 142. See Joint Declaration of the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and 
Northern Ireland and the Government of the People’s Republic of China on the Question of Hong 
Kong, Sept. 26, 1984, 23 I.L.M. 1371–87 [hereinafter Joint Declaration U.K.-P.R.C.]. The declaration 
was meant to “maint[ain]. . . the prosperity and stability of Hong Kong and to the further strengthening 
and development of the relations between the two countries . . . .” Id. at 1371. 
 143. Id. at 1371.  
 144. See The Basic Law [Constitution] (H.K.) [hereinafter Basic Law], http://www.info.gov.hk/ 
basic_law/fulltext/index.htm. Hong Kong’s Constitution is not a constitution, per se, because the 
P.R.C. enacted the law. See id. Hong Kong neither ratified nor agreed to the Basic Law; it was just a 
legislative measure of preserving Hong Kong’s autonomy. See Cooney, supra note 21, at 527–28; see 
also Landry, supra note 139, at 254.  
 145. Basic Law, supra note 144, art. 2.  
 146. Cooney, supra note 7, at 525; see also infra notes 150–74 and accompanying text. 
 147. Joint Declaration U.K.-P.R.C., supra note 142, Annex. I, art. XII. Although Hong Kong is 
responsible for maintaining peace within the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (HKSAR), 
the P.R.C. may send “[m]ilitary forces . . . to be stationed in the Hong Kong Special Administrative 
Region for the purpose of defence [sic] shall not interfere in the internal affairs of the Hong Kong 
Special Administrative Region. Expenditure for these military forces shall be borne by the Central 
People’s Government.”  
 148. Cooney, supra note 7, at 532–38. Although the executives are elected by the people of 
HKSAR, they are appointed by the P.R.C.’s Central People’s Government. Joint Declaration U.K.-
P.R.C., supra note 142, Annex I, art. I. The Chief Executive must implement the directives of the 
CPG, and is accountable to both the P.R.C. and HKSAR. Basic Law, supra note 144, art. 43, 48(8). In 
the event of a conflict between the P.R.C. and HKSAR, the Basic Law does not provide a resolution. 
See Cooney, supra note 7, at 537. In addition, the Executive cannot act in a way inconsistent with the 
Basic Law, despite the fact that some actions might be in Hong Kong’s best interest. See id. at 533.  
 149. Basic Law, supra note 144, art. 18.  
In the event that the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress decides to 
declare a state of war or, by reason of turmoil within the Hong Kong Special Administrative 
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Despite these limitations, HKSAR is granted essentially total economic 
freedom.150 HKSAR’s finances are completely separate from those of the 
P.R.C..151 The P.R.C. cannot levy taxes on Hong Kong152 nor can it 
require HKSAR to remit its revenues.153 The region is permitted to 
establish its own financial and monetary policies.154 Also, it retains 
international financial center status,155 maintains its own currency,156 
manages its own customs ports,157 and regulates the structures of its 
professions.158  
The only notable limitation on Hong Kong’s freedom to control its 
economy is the region’s restricted participation in international 
relations.159 Hong Kong may enter into international agreements, but must 
do so under the name “Hong Kong, China.”160 Hong Kong is able to 
participate in international organizations in which statehood is not a 
prerequisite,161 but it cannot participate in organizations that are limited to 
 
 
Region . . . [or] decides that the Region is in a state of emergency, the Central People’s 
Government may issue an order applying the relevant national laws in the Region. 
Id. 
 150. See infra notes 171–81 and accompanying text. 
 151. See infra note 152 and accompanying text. 
 152. “The Hong Kong Special Administrative Region shall practice an independent taxation 
system.” Basic Law, supra note 144, art. 108. “The Central People’s Government shall not levy taxes 
in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region.” Id. art. 106.  
 153. “The Hong Kong Special Administrative Region shall use its financial revenues exclusively 
for its own purposes, and they shall not be handed over to the Central People’s Government.” Id.  
 154. “The Government of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region shall, on its own, 
formulate monetary and financial policies, safeguard the free operation of financial business and 
financial markets, and regulate and supervise them in accordance with law.” Id. art. 110.  
 155. “The Government of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region shall provide an 
appropriate economic and legal environment for the maintenance of the status of Hong Kong as an 
international financial centre” Id. art. 109. 
 156. “The Government of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region may authorize 
designated banks to issue or continue to issue Hong Kong currency under statutory authority . . . .” 
Basic Law, supra note 144, art. 111.  
 157. “The Hong Kong Special Administrative Region shall be a separate customs territory.” Id. 
art. 116.  
 158. “The Government of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region shall, on the basis of 
maintaining the previous systems concerning the professions, formulate provisions on its own for 
assessing the qualifications for practice in the various professions.” Id. art. 142.  
 159. See id. art. 116. 
 160. Id. 
 161. Joint Declaration U.K.-P.R.C., supra note 142, Annex. I, art. XI.  
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states.162 Finally, although Hong Kong was allowed to retain international 
agreements to which the P.R.C. was not a party,163 in agreements to which 
the P.R.C. is a party, China has the authority to decide whether those 
agreements apply to Hong Kong.164 
Hong Kong’s economy has greatly benefited China despite China’s 
minimal control over HKSAR’s economy and China’s inability to tax the 
region. Now Hong Kong is “one of the most free, open, and investment-
friendly economies in the world”165 and has been considered a window 
into investing in mainland China.166 During the early 1990s, investors 
flocked to Hong Kong, enticed partially by the Special Economic Zones 
(SEZ) established near Hong Kong by the P.R.C..167 These SEZs increased 
investment in both China and HKSAR.168 In addition, China benefited 
from Hong Kong’s status as a major financial center169 and the P.R.C. 
used Hong Kong’s expertise to strengthen its own banking regulations.170 
Perhaps the most significant benefit for China has been the connections 
that it has gained through Hong Kong’s relationship with the international 
community.171 These relationships have helped China strengthen its 
market capitalist system and develop meaningful international 
relationships.172 
 
 
 162. Id. Although Hong Kong is not allowed to directly participate in these organizations, Hong 
Kong’s “representatives will be allowed to participate as members of delegations of the government of 
the P.R.C. where they may express their views in the name of ‘Hong Kong, China.’” Landry, supra 
note 139, at 254–55. However, Hong Kong’s indirect participation is limited to fields which affect 
HKSAR. Id. at 255 n.29.  
 163. Id.  
 164. Joint Declaration U.K.-P.R.C., supra note 142, Annex. I, art. XI. China does not make this 
determination alone, however, and the P.R.C. will consult HKSAR before making a determination. Id.  
 165. Bradely Klein, Democracy Optional: China and the Developing World’s Challenge to the 
Washington Consensus, 22 UCLA PAC. BASIN L.J. 89, 111 n.104. (2004).  
 166. Rolf H. Weber, Repositioning Hong Kong as a Regional and International Financial Centre 
in View of China’s Imminent Accession to the WTO, 31 HONG KONG L.J. 122, 132 (2001).  
 167. Xiaoyong Li & Neal A. Stender, Investing in China: Changing Roles of Shanghai and 
Taiwan, 6 ACCA Docket no. 20 58, 62 (2002).  
 168. Id.  
 169. See infra note 170. Before Hong Kong was ceded to China in 1987, Hong Kong was the 
world’s third largest financial and gold trading center. Landry, supra note 139, at 252.  
 170. Amy Chunyan Wu, PRC’s Commercial Banking System: Is Universal Banking a Better 
Model?, 37 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 623, 641 (1999) (citing Hong Kong Shows China How to do 
Things, TORONTO STAR, July 26, 1998, at 1) (noting that the Hong Kong Monetary Authority “sends 
missions to China to show how to develop financial markets, helps China draft banking laws, and 
helps China introduce international standards such as classification of loans.”). 
 171. Peter K. Yu, Succession by Estoppel: Hong Kong’s Succession to the ICCPR, 27 PEPP. L. 
REV. 53, 98 & n.265 (1999).  
 172. See China.org, CEPA Benefits Both China Mainland, Hong Kong, http://www.china.org.cn/ 
english/BAT/69298.htm (last visited Mar. 9, 2006) (discussing the mutual benefits gained from 
international relationships and investment in Hong Kong).  
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The Basic Law will apply to Hong Kong for at least 50 years: from 
1997 to 2047.173 Thereafter the administration of Hong Kong is unclear.174 
IV. ARGUMENT  
China’s anti-secession law is linked, at least partially, to its increasing 
market capitalism.175 Although reunification and economic reform may 
have been separate policies when they were formulated in the late 
1970s,176 they have since merged and become interrelated.177 Initially, 
China’s relative lack of control over Taiwan under the OCTS model would 
appear to decrease economic motivation for reunification.178 Indeed, China 
would lack the ability to levy taxes or any other direct exaction on 
Taiwan.179 However, this lack of direct control under the OCTS model is 
the underlying motivation for the system. The reason for this is the 
inherent struggle between market capitalism and socialism.  
China’s ideological struggle with market capitalism, within the context 
of a socialist system, is the motivating force behind applying the OCTS 
model to Taiwan. Maintaining the balance between a socialist society and 
a market driven economy is difficult. In fact, it is so difficult that some 
scholars consider market capitalism a natural forerunner to democracy.180 
Since the 1970s, China has struggled to remain competitive in the global 
 
 
 173. Joint Declaration U.K.-P.R.C., supra note 142, para. 3(12). 
 174. See id. 
 175. See infra notes 176–93 and accompanying text.  
 176. This was, perhaps, a function of the administration change that occurred after Mao’s death.  
 177. See supra notes 10–27 and accompanying text.  
 178. Under the proposed OCTS model, China evinced a desire to have any control over Taiwan’s 
economy whatsoever. See supra notes 122–74 and accompanying text.  
 179. See supra notes 150–58 and accompanying text.  
 180. See generally BRUCE GILLEY, CHINA’S DEMOCRATIC FUTURE: HOW IT WILL HAPPEN AND 
WHERE IT WILL LEAD (Columbia Univ. Press, 2004) (arguing that China will become a fully 
democratic country in the near future due to foundation laid by, inter alia, market capitalism); Yijiang 
Ding, The Conceptual Evolution of Democracy in Intellectual Circles’ Rethinking of State and Society, 
in CHINA AND DEMOCRACY: RECONSIDERING THE PROSPECTS FOR A DEMOCRATIC CHINA 111, 115 
(Suisheng Zhao ed., Routledge 2000) (noting that Chinese intellectuals considered market capitalism a 
prerequisite to complete democracy); Amy L. Chua, Markets, Democracy, and Ethnicity: Toward a 
New Paradigm for Law and Development, 108 YALE L.J. 1, 14–19 (1998) (discussing how market 
capitalism and democracy reinforce each other); Miron Mushkat & Roda Mushkat, Economic Growth, 
Democracy, the Rule of Law, and China’s Future, 29 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 229, 229 (2005) (noting 
that “development industrialization or modernization almost invariably lead[] to progress . . . in the 
political realm”) (internal quotations omitted); but see Bradely Klein, Democracy Optional: China and 
the Developing World’s Challenge to the Washington Consensus, 22 UCLA PAC. BASIN L.J. 89 (2004) 
(arguing that China has defied the “universal” formula for national development).  
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economy without deviating from its socialist doctrine.181 This struggle has 
lead to the overhaul of several of China’s socialist theories182 and to three 
constitutional amendments concerning the economy.183 If economic 
growth were to remain limited by China’s socialist system, China would 
eventually be forced to choose between democracy and socialism.184 The 
OCTS model, however, provides the country with a middle ground. Under 
OCTS, China could experience the benefits of being associated with a 
democratic region without becoming democratic itself.185 Viewed in this 
light, it is clear why Mao Zedong had little interest in immediate 
reunification with Taiwan. Taiwan was not a key component of the 
P.R.C.’s economy at that time. 
Additionally, if the economic aspect of the OCTS model is applied to 
Taiwan in a way similar to the way that it has been applied to Hong Kong, 
China can expect to benefit greatly from Taiwan’s economy.186 Since 
ROC took over Taiwan, the territory has experienced a long period of 
economic prosperity and stability.187 Taiwan has the 17th largest economy 
 
 
 181. This is perhaps most evidenced by the fact that, despite amending its constitution in order to 
embrace market capitalist principles, China has reemphasized its commitment to socialism. See supra 
notes 78–93 and accompanying text. This tension has led some commentators to wonder whether 
China is even practicing socialism. See Danielle Costa, China’s Economy: Free-markets or Socialism?, 
http://www.indyflicks.com/danielle/papers/paper11.htm (last visited Mar. 9, 2006). 
 182. The reinterpretation of the Marxist land-use theory, for instance, has eventually culminated in 
China adopting a constitutional amendment that incorporates language similar to that in the Fifth 
Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. Phan, supra note 65, at 613–14; XIAN FA art. 10 (2004) (P.R.C.).  
 183. See supra notes 70–85 and accompanying text. China amended its constitution again in 2004, 
but these amendments dealt mostly with the protection of human rights and private property. Killion, 
supra note 70, at 56.  
 184. If market capitalism does, in fact, eventually lead to democracy, this is the choice that China 
faces. In fact, since China’s shift towards market capitalism, it has seen an increase in the desire for the 
rule of law, and also for political reform. See Eric W. Orts, The Rule of Law in China, 34 VAND. J. 
TRANSNAT’L L. 43, 43–59 (2001) (discussing the rise of the rule of law in China); Benjamin van 
Rooij, China’s War on Graft: Politico-Legal Campaigns Against Corruption in China and Their 
Similarities to the Legal Reactions to Crisis in the U.S., 14 PAC. RIM. L. & POL’Y J. 289, 289–336 
(2005). The rule of law, political reform, market capitalism, and democracy are part of the “universal” 
formula for national development. See supra note 180 and accompanying text.  
 185. This is true because Taiwan, like Hong Kong, would be used as a conduit through which the 
benefits of democracy would flow. See supra text accompanying notes 166–74. China would not be 
directly exposed to Taiwan’s democracy because the governments and economies would remain 
separate under the OCTS model. Id. and accompanying notes. 
 186. See id. and accompanying notes. Some scholars argue that the OCTS model as applied to 
Hong Kong would not work in regards to Taiwan, due to Taiwan’s more developed political system 
and its developed sense of independence. See Charney, supra note 7, at 499–548. However, these 
authors focus on the political restrains placed on Hong Kong, not the relatively weak economic 
restraints. Id. In this regard, there is no reason to believe that the economic portion of the OCTS, as 
applied in Hong Kong, could not work in regards to Taiwan.  
 187. See Thayer Watkins, The Economic History and Economy of Taiwan, http://www2.sjsu.edu/ 
faculty/watkins/taiwan.htm (last visited Mar. 9, 2006).  
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in the world188 and the world’s third largest trade surplus.189 Taiwanese 
businesses are heavily invested in China’s infrastructure.190 Taiwan has 
also developed meaningful trade and diplomatic ties while maintaining 
official relationships with about 30 nations and unofficial ones with many 
more.191 Taiwan also belongs to several intergovernmental 
organizations.192 Assuming that Taiwan peacefully agrees to the OCTS 
model, China should enjoy essentially the same benefits as Taiwan.193  
Considering the two arguments above and the fact that Taiwan has 
grown ever closer to declaring its independence from the P.R.C., China’s 
Anti-Secession law can only be viewed as stop-gap measure to ensure 
China’s economic future.  
CONCLUSION 
In the past, China may have refused to relinquish sovereignty over 
Taiwan to preserve its honor after being defeated by Japan194 or because of 
the desire to liberate the Taiwanese people.195 Now, however, China’s 
desires are economic.196 China’s socialist market economy has caused a 
ideological conflict within the country. Faced with the prospects of either 
a slowing economy or a slow march towards democracy, the OCTS model 
presents an “innovative” middle ground.197 This model is the epitome of a 
socialist market economy198 and, in it, China would experience the 
benefits of a democratic free market while maintaining its socialist system. 
Although it is unclear whether the Anti-Secession law will aid in 
 
 
 188. Taiwan’s Economy, http://www.asianinfo.org/asianinfo/taiwan/pro-economy.htm (last visited 
Mar. 8, 2006).  
 189. Id. 
 190. See Amy Bickers, China/Taiwan Economy, transcript available at http://www.fas.org/news/ 
taiwan/1999/990811-taiwan1.htm (last visited Nov. 14, 2006). 
 191. Carolan, supra note 13, at 455; Huang, supra note 33, at 146–47. 
 192. For instance, Taiwan is a member of the Asian development Bank, which is “aimed at 
improving the welfare of the people in Asia and the Pacific . . . .” Asian Development Bank, 
http://www.adb.org/About/default.asp (last visited Mar. 9, 2006); Huang, supra note 33, at 146. 
 193. Some authors argue that the OCTS, applied in its entirety, would not work in regards to 
Taiwan. See Cooney, supra note 21, at 499–548. This note does not rely on that proposition. 
 194. Fu, supra note 51, at 332 (arguing that China’s desire to regain Taiwan is deeply rooted in 
the psyche of the Chinese people, and that reunification is needed to avoid national shame).  
 195. Id.  
 196. See supra text accompanying notes 175–93. 
 197. See supra notes 78–79 and accompanying text. 
 198. See supra notes 122–35 and accompanying text. 
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reunifying Taiwan with China, it is clear that market capitalism is at least 
partially responsible for aggression.  
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